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This paper assesses the appropriate cigarette tax needed to address po-
tential market failures. There is no evidence of inadequate risk decisions
by smokers regarding their own welfare. Detailed calculations of the
financial externalities of smoking indicate that the financial savings from
premature mortality in terms of lower nursing home costs and retire-
ment pensions exceed the higher medical care and life insurance costs
generated. The costs of environmental tobacco smoke are highly uncer-
tain, but of potentially substantial magnitude. Even with recognition of
these costs, current cigarette taxes exceed the magnitude of the esti-
mated net externalities.
1. INTRODUCTION
Cigarette smoking has long been the object of social controversy and
policy interventions. However, in recent years this scrutiny has become
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greater. Within 1994 alone there was an unusually large flurry of anti-
smoking activity. The chairman of the Food and Drug Administration
speculated that cigarettes should be regulated by that agency because, in
his view, nicotine is addictive. The Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration proposed a ban on smoking in the workplace, except in
situations in which firms provide designated, ventilated smoking areas
(see Federal Register, April 5, 1994, pp. 15968-16039). Similarly, Con-
gress, with the support of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
began considering legislation that would lead to a ban on public smoking
(see the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1994).
Within the context of this antismoking fervor, legislators have also
turned to cigarette taxes as a mechanism for raising revenues to partially
finance the proposed health care reforms. Although Federal cigarette
taxes are currently 24 cents per pack, the proposed legislation would
increase these taxes further. The mid-1994 version of the Clinton plan
would impose a tax of 99 cents per pack, the health care proposal by
Senate majority leader George Mitchell would impose a tax of 69 cents
per pack, and one draft health care bifi from the House Education and
Labor Committee would impose a tax of $2 per pack.
The legislators who proposed these taxes may overestimate the ulti-
mate tax revenues if they fail to recognize the demand response. Not
only is the demand for smoking quite elastic and similar to that of many
other goods, but the long-run elasticity is even greater than in the short
run. As a result, economists such as Becker, Grossman, and Murphy
(1994) have estimated that the long-run revenue effects of the cigarette
taxes will be less dramatic than the short-run revenue gains.
There are many reasons why, from a political standpoint, taxes might
be imposed. One possible explanation is political expediency. Cigarette
smokers now constitute a minority of the population. Moreover, given
the social controversy pertaining to smoking, they are a vulnerable mi-
nority for which there will be lower political costs associated with taxa-
tion than, for example, a more broadly based tax.
There may also be legitimate economic rationales for taxing cigarettes,
wholly apart from the desire to raise revenues. Cigarette taxes and alco-
hol taxes are among the most widely used forms of "sin taxes." The
economic rationale for such taxes is that imposing taxes discourages
behavior that may be associated with inefficient decisions. The inadequa-
cies in behavior may pertain to the choices by smokers with respect to
their own well-being or that of their families. Taxes could be imposed to
align these decisions with what would prevail if individual choices were
rational from a self-interest standpoint. A second impetus for taxation
would arise if there were net external costs imposed on the rest ofCigarette Taxation and Social Consequences of Smoking53
society by cigarette smoking. In that case, cigarette taxes would function
much like a Pigouvian tax to lead smokers to internalize the external
costs of their actions.
Although the potential rationales for cigarette taxation are clear,
whether or not there should be taxation of any kind from the standpoint
of promoting efficient decisions is not theoretically obvious. Smokers
may ignore the externality to their futureselves and their families and
make inadequate self-protective decisions. However, there may also be
distortions of the opposite type in which smokers overestimate the risk
and place too great a weight on the losses involved. The efficient risk is
not necessarily zero but rather one that reflects the competing benefits
and costs associated with smoking activity.
The externality aspects of smoking likewise involve competing effects.
Cigarette smokers have no private incentive to internalize all of the
effects of smoking on others, but these effects are not necessarily ad-
verse on balance. To the extent that cigarettesmoking leads to adverse
health consequences, there will be higher health insurance costs associ-
ated with these illnesses as well as other social externalities, such as life
insurance costs. However, there may also be offsetting cost savings from
earlier mortality through reduced costs of pensions, Social Security,
Medicare, and health expenditures later in life. In tallying these exter-
nalities, one should also take into account any adverse health effects of
environmental tobacco smoke to the extent that these can be reliably
estimated. It is not clear a priori whether the cost savings to society are
exceeded by the costs imposed on society. Resolving these issues re-
quires a detailed empirical assessment of the competing influences.
In this paper I will provide a careful examination of the social conse-
quences of smoking both for the smoker and society at large. Pastanalyses
directed at ascertaining the net cost of smoking and the appropriate taxa-
tion of smoking have focused only on one of the two components, either
the individual effects or the societal insurance effects. This paper will be
the first to incorporate both dimensions into the analysis. In addition, the
assessment of the social consequences of smoking will include extensions
that have not appeared in previous assessments. This analysis incorpo-
rates recognition of the possible costs associated with environmental to-
bacco smoke.1 In addition, all the risk assessments will recognize the
changing character of cigarettes and, in particular, the dramatic reduction
in the tar levels of cigarettes over the past several decades. In contrast,
past risk assessments and evaluations of cigarettes have all utilized risk
1Gravelle and Zimmerman (1994) provide a much briefer assessment of the role of environ-
mental tobacco smoke because they do not believe the risk estimates are credible.54Viscusi
estimates that pertain to an era of cigarette smoking in which the product
had quite different characteristics from those marketed today.
After reviewing the rationale for setting cigarette taxes in Section 2, I
will provide a profile of current cigarette taxes in Section 3. Cigarette tax
revenues are quite substantial, but these taxes are also regressive in
character, which is an unattractive feature. Section 4 details the shift in
the tar characteristics in cigarettes and the implications of this shift for
cigarette risk assessments. In Section 5, I assess the externalities of ciga-
rette smoking to the smoker's future self and to the smoker's family.
Section 6 assesses the insurance-related externalities associated with
smoking, including effects on health insurance, Social Security, pen-
sions, life insurance, and related programs. Section 7 broadens the dis-
cussion to include the public health risk consequences of environmental
tobacco smoke. As the concluding Section 8 indicates, on balance the net
social consequences of smoking do not appear to be adverse. From the
standpoint of an optimal sin tax, no additional taxation appears war-
ranted. The current level of taxes already exceeds what is required to
reflect the estimated adverse social consequences of smoking.
2. SETTING THE EFFICIENT TAX LEVEL
To determine the optimal sin tax in the case of cigarette smoking, one
should assess how this tax should be adjusted to reflect both the poten-
tial welfare losses to smokers as well as the losses to society that are not
accounted for in private smoking decisions. For the purpose of this
discussion, I will hypothesize that individuals potentially underestimate
the risks of smoking and that there are net societal costs imposed by
smoking. If there are such market failures, how then could the taxsys-
tem serve a constructive role in rectifying these errors in decisions?
Frameworks such as these follow a logic that is natural for economists,
but policy makers considering smoking taxes seldom frame these taxes
in terms of deterring smoking in an efficient manner. In effect, the poten-
tial efficiency properties of the risky decisions are neglected, and there is
typically exclusive emphasis on the potential errors in these decisions.
The framework here will focus on an individual decision maker. If this
person does not smoke cigarettes, then the consumer will derive a wel-
fare level W(Y) from an income level Y. The consumer has the opportu-
nity to purchase cigarettes at a price P, and doing so will lead to two
possible health state outcomes, good health in which the individual
derives a utility U(Y - P) and ill health in which the utility level is V(Y-
P). The ill health state potentially could be death, in which case V will
serve as the bequest function. Assume that there is a true health riskITCigarette Taxation and Social Consequences of Smoking55
posed by cigarettes, where this probability is notnecessarily known to
the decision maker. There is also a social loss L thatdoes not enter the
decision maker's calculus of the attractiveness ofsmoking, where the
probability that the loss will be inflicted is
From the standpoint of social desirability of smoking,the individual is
making a rational choice if the expected utilityderived by the smoker
from smoking exceeds the expected cost imposed onsociety plus the
utility derived from not smoking, or
(1_T)U(YP)+1rV(YP)>W(Y)+1TL. (1)
This formulation ignores the role of taxes, which will beintroduced subse-
quently as a mechanism for eliminating potential errors indecisions.
There are two principal ways in which decisions might beflawed.
First, individuals may not have accurate perceptionsof the risk ii, and
second they will have no private incentive to recognize the net exter-
nality costs imposed by others. In particular, the privatedecision in the
case in which there is nottaxation will be based on the individual's
assessed probability of ill health q, which may differ from ir, leading to a
private choice criterion of
(1 - q)U(Y - P) + qV(Y - P) > W(Y). (2)
The private decision differs from the optimalsocial decision in that it
neglects the expected externality cost and does not accountfor the possi-
ble discrepancy between r and q. In effect,smokers could fail in two
waysby harming their future selves and by imposing netexternality
costs on society.
Even if smokers do not accurately perceive the risks, itdoes not neces-
sarily follow that their decisions are in error. Consider the casein which
individuals underassess the risks associated with smoking. It maybe
that even with an underassessment, the decision to smokewould not be
altered if the consumer's risk perception were replaced by the trueproba-
bilityr. Thus, the pertinent issuefrom the standpoint of efficient deci-
sion making with respect to risk information is whetherrisky decisions
would be the same in the presence of better risk information orwhether
they would change.
Suppose that S is the amount that an individual needs tobe compen-
sated in order to be made indifferent between smoking andnonsmok-
ing. In the case of people who prefer to smoke,the value of S is
positive, whereas in the case of people who choose not tosmoke, the
value of S is negative so that they would be willing to pay some non-56Viscusi
zero amount to avoid smoking. Suppose that evaluated at the true risk
ir, people would choose to smoke. Then S is positive and satisfies the
following condition:
(1IT)U(Y+5P)+7Tv(Y+Sp)w(y) (3)
If individuals underestimate the risk initially (i.e.,q < ir) but still would
have a positive value of S when evaluated at the true probabilitiesas in
equation (3), then cigarette smoking is still rational from the individual's
standpoint.
If, however, q is sufficiently belowr, then the situation may arise in
which, based on the true risk of smoking, it wouldnot be rational to
smoke. The value of S evaluated at the time riskr consequently will be
negative.
This bias in consumer perceptions can potentially be reducedor elimi-
nated through information provision. The governmentcan convey infor-
mation about the hazards of smoking so that individuals revise their
subjective probability assessmentsq for the smoking risks and increase
them to a more appropriate levelir. Nevertheless, even with accurate
risk perceptions, the expected societal loss termon the right side of
equation (1) will not be incorporated in individual actions. What is
needed from an economic standpoint is some mechanismto discourage
smoking so individuals will, in effect, have the appropriate disincentive
for smoking given the societal costs. This class of problemsis the well-
known Pigouvian externality situation in whichan appropriate tax can
lead individual economic actors to incorporate the externaleffects of
their decisions in their behavior. In addition, this taxmay also serve the
function of discouraging smoking in much thesame way as would
higher risk perceptions. Thus, a taxcan both reflect the societal exter-
nality as well as the discrepancy betweenq andin situations in which
individuals underassess the smoking risk.
The individual will choose to smoke in thepresence of a tax T if this
tax satisfies
(1q)U(YP--T)+qV(Y_P_r)>w(y). (4)
This tax will lead to the same pattern of individual decisionsas in the
socially optimal situation characterized by inequality (1) if itis set
appropriately.
The focus of the subsequent sections will be twofold.First, I will
examine possible discrepancies betweenq and IT and how these influ-
ence individuals' propensity to smoke. Second, I will address the wideCigarette Taxation and Social Consequences of Smoking57
range of externalities associated withsmoking to ascertain their magni-
bide, direction, and relationship to an appropriate taxlevel.
3. PROFILE OF THE CIGARETTETAX
Cigarettes are the most heavily taxed major categoryof consumer pur-
chases. Relative to the purchase amount, tobacco products aresubject to a
higher tax rate than alcohol, three times the tax rate ofgasoline, and over
10 times the tax rate imposed on items such as utilitiesand automobiles.2
Since roughly one-fourth of American adults continue tosmoke, the
potential tax revenues associated with the cigarette tax aresubstantial
(see Centers for Disease Control, 1994). For the fiscal yearending June
30, 1993, the total of federal, state, and municipal taxes oncigarettes was
$12 billion.3 This tax share is roughly equally divided betweenthe fed-
eral government and the states. The total federal tobacco tax was$5.5
billion in 1993, or an average of 24 cents a pack. The state taxtotal was
$6.2 billion, or 28.6 cents per pack. Overall, the federaland state taxes
totaled 31.4 percent of the retail price of cigarettes.Municipal taxes
added an additional $187 million. Since almost all of thetobacco taxes are
accounted for by cigarettes-98.7 percent in 1993Iwill use the ciga-
rette tax and tobacco tax label interchangeably.4
Although the absolute magnitude of cigarette taxes has neverbeen
higher than at its current level, these taxes have beenhigher as a percent-
age of the retail price. These taxesreached a peak of 51.4 percent of the
total price of cigarettes in 1965, immediately after theinitial government
report on lung cancer and smoking. The percentagetaxation varies over
time because the tax is set in absolute amounts and isvaried periodically.
Over the past 50 years, federal cigarette taxes haveheld only five differ-
ent levels, 7.0 cents per pack beginning in 1942,8.0 cents per pack in
1951, 16.0 cents per pack in 1983, 20.0 cents perpack in 1991, and 24.0
cents per pack in 1993. The absolute levelof the tax and the periodic
nature of the tax revision has as a consequenceresulted in swings in the
cigarette tax percentage relative to retail price.
2These assessments are based on the calculations presented byFullerton and Rogers
(1993, p. 74). Their measure of the severity of taxation is the ratioof taxes paid to the value
of gross purchases minus taxes paid. Based on this statistic, theimplied tax rate in 1984 for
tobacco is 0.79, for alcohol it is 0.73, for gasoline it is 0.26, forutilities it is 0.04, and for
automobiles it is 0.06.
These and other tax statistics reported in this paragraph are drawnfrom the Tobacco
Institute (1993, p. vii).
This percentage of the cigarette tax share is drawn from p. 5 of theTobacco Institute
(1993).58Viscusi
To assess the regressivity of cigarette taxes, Table 1 provides informa-
lion on the distribution of taxes by income group. An introductoryca-
veat is that one should be cautious in interpreting the incidence statistics
for cigarette taxes, since the income levelsare based on reported income
at a point in time. Income levels for lower incomegroups appear to be
poorly measured, and these figures substantially understate the lifetime
income levels for these groups. As shown in Poterba (1989), thelifetime
incidence patterns of taxes tend to bemore egalitarian than the cross-
sectional statistics would suggest. An additionalcaveat is that these
statistics simply examine the average taxes paidper smoker without
using a more detailed model of the nature of the ultimate tax incidence.
Even taking these cautionary observations intoaccount, the patterns
in Table 1 appear to be particularly stark. Column 2 of Table1 indicates
the percentage of the different incomegroups who smoke. This percent-
age is a high 31.6 percent for those who make less than $10,000 and hasa
low value of 19.3 percent for those who make $50,000or more. In terms
of the overall share of the smoking population, whichis given in column
3, both the smoking prevalence and the income group's sharein the
population are pertinent. For the incomegroups shown, the most fre-
quently represented smoking group is the middle incomerange at
$20,000-34,999, but this is also the group with the largest fraction ofthe
population.
A more pertinent statistic is the smoking fraction of the differentincome
group relative to the fraction of the population represented by that income
group. This ratio, which appears in column 4 of Table 1, indicates that the
smoker ratio is highest for the poorer incomegroups and lowest for the
upper income groups. This ratio ranges from 1.24 for those who make less
than $10,000 to 0.75 for those who make $50,000or more. For the three
lowest of the five income groups shown in Table 1, the relativesmoking
fraction of the group exceeds the population fraction, whichis striking
evidence of the income status correlation of smoking.
The average taxes paid for eachperson in the income group range
from $49 for those who make $50,000or more to $81 for those who make
less than $10,000. The cigarette taxper person is consequently over one
and one-half times as great for the poorestsegment of the population
when compared with the most affluentgroup. These absolute differ-
ences lead to even starker percentage differences, as is indicated in
column 6. As a percentage of individual income, cigarettetaxes are negli-
gible for those who make $50,000 ormore, as these taxes constitute
under one-tenth of 1 percent of this group's income. Incontrast, for


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































These calculations, however, understate the ultimate effect of ciga-
rette taxes on those who pay them, since they average the tax amount
over the entire population in the income group, not simply smokers. If
one focuses on column 7 in Table 1, one finds that the cigarette tax
percentage of the median income of smokers ranges from 0.4 percent for
those who make $50,000 or more to a percentage amount that is almost
13 times as greatS. 1 percent for those who make less than $10,000.
Cigarette taxes are strikingly regressive.
Because of the strong correlation of income and educational levels, the
educational breakdown of tax incidence shown in Table 1 followsa pat-
tern similar to what one would expect based on the income breakdowns.
The average taxes paid per person decline steadily with educational
level, since these amounts exhibit a high value of $82per person for
those with less than a high-school education, and a low of $47per
person with at least some college. The racial differences shown in Table 1
appear to be relatively minor, since blacks pay an average tax per person
almost identical to that of whites. The percentage share of the tax in the
income of blacks will, of course, be higher.
The starkest distinction shown in Table 1 is the strong linkage of
cigarette taxes to individual income levels. An undesirable feature of
cigarette taxes is their regressivity. Since cigarette consumption isa de-
creasing function of income, even the total amount of cigarette taxes
paid by the lower income groups is greater than that in upper income
groups. Cigarette taxes are consequently regressive in absolute terms,
not simply in proportional terms.
4. THE CHANGING CIGARETTE
The increased public concern with the risks of smoking has led to two
major changes in the characteristics of cigarette smoking. First, cigarette
smoking is much less prevalent now than it was in the past. Second, the
kinds of cigarettes people smoke are quite different from those smoked
decades earlier. In particular, the "tar" level, which is the most fre-
quently used composite measure of the chemical residues linked tocan-
cer risks of smoking, has declined as smokers have switched to lighter
cigarettes. Many assessments of cigarette smoking have taken intoac-
count the changing frequency of smoking, but none of these studies has
incorporated the shift in tar levels in these risk assessments.
This omission is quite fundamental, as it has broad ramifications for
the assessed risks of smoking, the rationality of smoking decisions, and
the magnitude of societal externalities. Lower tar levels imply that the
risk levels associated with smoking will be less than those that have beenCigarette Taxation and Social Consequences of Smoking61
estimated. This discrepancy is not a minor nuance. The pertinentsmok-
ing era currently used for many risk assessments maybe as much as a
half a century out of date.
Two lags arise. First, the studies that are used informulating the risk
assessments often are not current, but instead havebeen undertaken a
decade or more ago. Second, the smoking exposures that gaverise to the
risks identified in these studies preceded the publicationdates for these
studies because of the substantial lag involved between exposureto
carcinogens and incidence of the disease. If, forexample, there is a
three-decade lag between cigarette smoking and the onsetof lung can-
cer, and if the study estimatingsuch a linkage is a decade old, then in
effect there is a 40-year lag in the pertinence of theevidence.
In this section I will review the changing historyof the tar levels of
cigarettes and the implications of this shift for thepotential riskiness of
cigarette smoking. The adjustments that I will makewill be linear, since
reductions in tar will be weighted proportionally.5These adjustments
are likely to be overly conservativeto the extent that there is a no-risk
threshold for carcinogenic exposures, which is consistentwith much of
the evidence on the causation of cancer.6
Figure 1 illustrates the shifting level of tar incigarettes.7 The bottom
trend, indicated as the "raw" data, pertain to the averagelevel of tar in
cigarettes observed in that year. These levels wereestimated to be 46.1
milligrams of tar per cigarette in 1944, which dropped to12 milligrams of
tarby 1994.
Figure 1 also illustrates the 20-year and 30-year averageof these tar lev-
els, where these averages are for the 20- and 30-yearperiod preceding the
date indicated. These moving averages indicate higher average tarlevels
of cigarettes and smoother declines. Examination ofthese 20- and 30-year
averages is potentially more pertinent tothe extent that it is a weighted
average of exposure amounts over a longperiod of time that generates the
risk rather than point estimates of the risk level. Allof the results in Figure
Evidence in support of the linearity of the doseresponserelationship appears in the
International Agency for Research on Cancer (1985).
6For discussion of the zero or minimal risks posed by low levelsof carcinogens, see Ames
and Gold (1993), especially pp. 154-157. Also see Cothern(1992).
The tar data for 1954 and for 1968-1983 are from the Centers for DiseaseControl (1989),
p. 21. Data for1955-1967 are from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(1981), p. 207. Data for 1984-1993 are derived by running a regressionof average tar levels
on the percent of cigarettes with less than 15mgof tar (1967-1983) and using the resulting
coefficient to estimate tar levels. Data for 1923-1953 are derived by running aregression of
average tar levels on year and using the resultingcoefficient to estimate tar levels. The data
on percent of cigarettes with less than 15 mgof tar are taken from the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission (1992), pp. 28-30.62Viscusi
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FIGURE 1. Average Tar Level per Cigarette
1 pertain to risk levels at a period of time, taking intoaccount only those
lags explicitly indicated. If the lag structure is somewhat different,as for
example would be the case if risk exposures in the past decade didnot
affect one's probability of cancer but those in the two previous decades
did, then one would want to utffize a different weightingprocess.
The raw average tar levels of cigarettes displaya slight increase in the
1980s in Figure 1. This trend is attributable at least in part to the rising
market share of generic cigarettes. Generic cigarettes havea higher aver-
age tar level than premium brands, contributing to the observed pattern.
Figure 2 indicates the implications of these tar adjustments for the
potential riskiness of cigarette consumption. Those figuresrepresent
smoking levels per capita, where the base is the entire adult (age 18and
above) U.S. population, not simply the smoking population. The unad-
justed data appear at the top of Figure 2, since the number of cigarettes
consumed per capita rose until 1964, which is theyear in which the U.S.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare issued its landmarkre-
port on lung cancer and smoking (see the U.S. Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, 1964). Cigarette consumption continuedto de-
cline at a moderate pace until around 1983, after whichconsumption of
cigarettes has decreased more starkly.
The bottom pattern of cigarette consumption in Figure 2 makesa tar
adjustment, relative to the tar levels in cigarettes in 1944. Whereas unad-
justed cigarette consumption was rising for the next two decades, the
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FIGURE 2. Per Capita Cigarette Consumption
tar-adjusted cigarette consumption levels were on the decline. This de-
crease occurred long before the adventof on-product cigarette warnings,
television and radio ad bans, and the concern over environmental to-
bacco smoke. Indeed, the pattern of tar-adjusted smoking exhibits a
fairly steady decline over the 1944-1984 period.
One of the steepest periods of decline in the tar-adjusted cigarette
consumption and in the average tar levels per cigarette shown in Figures 1
and 2 was 1957 to 1960. This was the era of the "Great Tar Derby" inwhich
the cigarette companies undertook an advertising war to highlightthe tar
and nicotine levels of their cigarettes. (For further discussion ofthe Great
Tar Derby, see Viscusi [1992b] and Calfee [1986].) Thismarket-based com-
petition led to advertising claims, such as "Today's Marlboro-22 percent
less tar, 34 percent less nicotine." The ban on tar and nicotineadvertising
enacted by the Federal Trade Commission in 1960 halted the dramatic
decline in tar-adjusted levels of cigarettes, leading to the flatteningof the
decline shown in Figures 1 and 2.
The main implication of Figure 2 is that the tar-weighted cigarette con-
sumption has followed a quite different pattern from overall percapita
cigarette consumption and should lead to a quite differentinterpretation
of smoking trends. The decline in the risk-weighted cigarette con-
1984 1994 1954 1944 1964 1974
Year64Viscusi
sumption is not as recent a phenomenon as the rawper capita cigarette
consumption figures would suggest. Tar-adjusted per capita cigarette
consumption has been on the decline for almost the entire past halfcen-
tury. Moreover, because of the linkage of cigarette risk estimates totar
levels, these estimates must be revised to reflect the tar content in orderto
be pertinent to the changing character of cigarettes.
Figure 3ac indicates the smoker's lifetime tar-weighted cigarette risks
if one assumes various different lags between cigarette consumption and
the generation of the risk. Whereas Figure 2 presented dataper capita
for the entire population, the data in Figure 3a areper capita, where the
baseline population consists of smokers only. These figuresaccount for
changes in the number of cigarettes smoked as the tar level changes but
not whether each particular cigarette was smoked more intensively. Fig-
ure 3a is based on risks being contemporaneous; Figure 3b incorporates
a 20-year latency where there is a fixed lag of exactly 20 years, not a
distributed lag over a 20-year period; and Figure 3c incorporatesa 30-
year latency period. For example, the risks in Figure 3b for 1994 arose
from smoking in 1964. In each case, the trendsare indexed so that the
relative exposure amount is 100 in 1944.
There is a wide discrepancy between the adjusted and unadjusted
lifetime exposure levels for cigarettes in 1994. However, the spread be-
tween the adjusted and unadjusted trends is starkest at an earlier date in
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FIGURE 3a. Smoker's Lifetime Exposure (tar and consumption ad-
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FIGURE 3b. Smoker's Lifetime Exposure (tar and consumption ad-














FIGURE 3c. Smoker's Lifetime Exposure (tar and consumptionad-
justed). Based on 30-Year Latency Period.
period narrows the gap between the adjusted and unadjusted figures,
particularly through the first three decades, and there is a further nar-
rowing of these early trends in the case of the 30-year latencyperiod.
The extent to which the lifetime risk is consequently going to beaffected




depend both on the era in which the risk assessmentsare made as well
as the lag assumption that is made.
5. EXTERNALITIES TO ONE'S FUTURE SELF
If smoking decisions do not satisfy the efficiency properties outlined in
Section 2 from the standpoint of individual rationality, then there will bea
market failure. If, for example, smokers underestimate the risk and smoke
in situations in which they would not do so if fully informed, then the
resulting risk level will be inefficient. Schelling (1984) refers to theseerrors
as externalities to one's future self because there is a time lag before the
adverse effects of smoking will become apparent. What Schellingsug-
gests is that one's future self may make different decisions thanone
would make if fully apprised of the long-term consequences of smoking.
There are several ways in which decisions might err. For example,some
observers have hypothesized that even if people understand the risk of
smoking, they may not appropriately value the healthconsequences of
smoking or may be addicted to smoking and unable to alter their behav-
ior. I explore these issues in detail elsewhere (1992a), but it is worthwhile
to summarize some of the principal empirical results that suggest that
smoking behavior follows patterns similar to that of other types ofcon-
sumption goods. The price elasticity and income elasticity estimates for
the demand for cigarettes are similar to those for other products. These
elasticity values, which have been documented in dozens of studies for
several countries, range from a negative price elasticity from 0.4 toa
price elasticity for teenagers of 1.4. (A comprehensive review of this
literature appears in Viscusi [1992b].) Becker, Grossman, and Murphy
(1994) also find that the long-run elasticity is greater than the short-run
elasticity, which is consistent with their model of rational addiction.
The character of the tradeoffs that smokers make in other contexts is
also consistent with risk-taking decisions in the smoking domain. In situa-
tions involving job hazards, smokers require compensationper expected
job injury of $26,100, whereas the average worker receives compensation
of $47,900 per statistical injury (see Hersch and Viscusi, 1990, and,more
generally, Viscusi, 1992a). The group most averse to risks, nonsmoking
individuals who also wear seatbelts, receive compensationper expected
injury of $83,200. The sorting of workers in the labor market and the
matching up of individuals to jobs of different risk with their correspond-
ing levels of compensation consequently follows the patternsone would
expect. Smokers tend to be at the lower end of the range in terms of their
implicit value of job injuries. This relative standing is also corroborated by
the results in Ippolito and Ippolito (1984), who found that the implicitCigarette Taxation and Social Consequences of Smoking67
value of life reflected in smoking behavior was in the range of $300,000 to
$600,000 in 1980, which is similar to the implicit values of life displayed by
workers who have matched themselves to relatively high-risk jobs. (For a
survey of the value of life literature, see Viscusi [1992a, 19931.)
The smoking propensity response to higher-risk perceptions is also con-
sistent with rational decision making. Higher assessed smoking risk prob-
abilities decrease the probability that an individual will smoke. Estimates
in Viscusi (1992b) of this linkage indicate that if current average lung can-
cer risk perceptions were decreased from their level of 0.43 to a value in
the estimated risk range based on earlier scientific evidence of 0.05-0.10,
then societal smoking rates would rise from 6.5 percent to 7.5 percent.
There is also evidence of responsiveness in terms of the kinds of
cigarettes selected (see Viscusi, 1992b). Individuals who express con-
cerns about the health consequences of smoking are much more likely to
smoke low-tar cigarettes (less than or equal to three milligrams tar per
cigarette), since 87.1 percent of those who smoke low-tar cigarettes indi-
cate such health concerns. In contrast, individuals who smoke high-tar
cigarettes (greater than or equal to 21 milligrams tar per cigarette) are
much less likely to express concern with the health risks of smoking,
since only 54.8 percent of this group indicates concern.
The primary focal point of my discussion will be on whether smokers
accurately perceive the risks of smoking. The two sets of survey data I
will use pertain to the years 1985 and 1991. The key issue is whether
smokers' risk beliefs in those years were as high as would be warranted
based on the scientific evidence at that time.
In assessing the accuracy of the risk perceptions, one must first estab-
lish the scientific reference point that will be used to ascertain the true
estimated risks of smoking. The surveys focus on both lung cancer risks
and total mortality risks, so that estimates are needed for each of these
risk groups. In addition, I make adjustments for the changing per
smoker consumption of cigarettes, since individuals may, for example,
smoke more cigarettes if they have switched to lower tar cigarettes.
Table 2 summarizes the sensitivity of the mortality estimates to the
changing level of tar in cigarettes. The three pairs of columns pertain to
the lung cancer risks, the overall mortality risk after making a tar adjust-
ment for lung cancer, and the overall mortality risk making tar adjust-
ments for all risks. Results appear for both 1985 and 1988. The scientific
reference point that will be adopted utilizes the adverse health effect
estimates presented in the annual reports by the U.S. Surgeon General.8
8Further details explaining the nature of my calculations using these data appear in
Viscusi (1992b). In my earlier treatment I only considered the unadjusted figures, ignoring



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4Cigarette Taxation and Social Consequences of Smoking69
The first row of risk estimates pertains to the risk estimated using scien-
tific data available at the time of each of the survey years. These data are
not adjusted for changes in tar levels. Both low and high estimates of the
risk range appear in each instance. The most recent data available for the
survey year 1991 are based on 1988 studies. In the case of lung cancer,
the estimated lifetime incremental risk due to smoking ranged from 0.05
to 0.10 in 1985 and from 0.06 to 0.13 based on 1988 evidence. The total
smoking mortality amount is roughly triple the lung cancer risk, since it
ranges from 0.16 to 0.32 in 1985 and from 0.18 to 0.36 in 1988.
Three sets of mortality estimates appear in Table 2. The first set per-
tains to lung cancer and the adjusted lung cancer mortality rates. The
second set of estimates addresses total smoking mortality, with tar ad-
justments for only the lung cancer component of total mortality, thus
understating the potential role of tar adjustments. The final pair of col-
umns in Table 2 makes tar adjustments for all mortality components,
which wifi tend to overstate the effect of shifts in tar levels.
The effect of the tar adjustments is substantial. In the case of lung
cancer, the change in the risk levels based on point estimates of therisk,
ignoring lags in the generation of the risk would be to decrease the risk
range to 0.04-0.09 in 1985 and from 0.05 to 0.12 in 1988. If,however,
lung cancer risks are generated by a moving average or by a lag, then the
risk levels that have been estimated by the Surgeon General will have
been generated by exposures to much higher levels of tar than are pres-
ent in the cigarettes today. Making the adjustments for the 20-year mov-
ing average or a 30-year moving average decrease the estimated lung
cancer risk by 0.02 so that the risk is approximately cut inhalf by the 30-
year moving average. If the risk is generated by the point estimateof the
exposure 20 or 30 years before the Surgeon General study, thenthe
lower end of the 1985 risk range is reduced to 0.03 in the 20-year case and
0.02 in the 30-year case. In effect, one can eliminate up to two-thirds of
the lung cancer risk level by making an appropriate adjustment for the
tar levels of cigarettes.
The adjustments in the case of total smoking mortality are less in
relative terms when only the lung cancer component is adjusted. Even
in the 30-year lag, point estimate case, the 1985 risk range drops only
from 0.16-0.32 to a range of 0.14-0.28, which is a very modest decline.
If, however, all mortality components are adjusted for changing tar lev-
els, the corresponding 1985 risk range becomes 0.06-0.11 in the 30-year
lag point estimate case. The shifts for the 1991 risk estimates follow
similar patterns.
The reported risk levels are considerably higher than any of these
estimates of the risk. The results reported in Table 3 are based on a70Viscusi
Risk perception Full sample Smokers
Lung cancer risk (1985) 0.43 0.37
Lung cancer fatality risk 0.38 0.31
(1991)
Total smoking mortality risk 0.54 0.47
(1991)
Source: Viscusi (1992b, pp. 69, 77).
national survey of lung cancer risk perceptions in 1985 and a North
Carolina survey that I undertook in 1991, each of which is reported in
Viscusi (1992b). The national smoking survey asked respondents how
many out of 100 smokers would get lung cancer because they smoked;
these responses have been converted to a fraction for the purposes of
reporting in Table 3. My 1991 survey questions alter this wording some-
what, asking about the lung cancer fatality risk level rather than the lung
cancer incidence level and asking respondents about the total smoking
mortality risk.
In each case, the risk perceptions are substantial. Smokers estimate
the lung cancer risk as being 0.37 and the lung cancer fatality risk as 0.31,
where each of these estimates is roughly 5 to 10 times larger than the
various adjusted lung cancer mortality risk estimates shown in Table 3.
Similarly, the overall smoking mortality estimate of 0.47 indicates that
smokers believe the risk of death from smoking is almost a 50-50 propo-
sition, unfavorable odds that are considerably more adverse than any of
the risk estimates shown in the final columns in Table 2.
One particularly controversial group in society is that of younger smok-
ers, since many smoking critics believe that these individuals will begin
smoking at a young age and be discouraged by the transactions costs of
changing smoking from altering their behavior. Whereas the popular
belief is that the young underassess the risk of smoking, in fact the
opposite is the case. Indeed, younger smokers overestimate the risks by
more than do their senior counterparts. In the case of the 1985 national
survey, respondents aged 16-21 assessed the average lung cancer risk as
being 0.49, or a value that is 0.06 greater than that for society as a whole.
Smokers in this younger age group assess the lung cancer risks as being
0.45, which is 0.08 greater than that of the entire smoking population.
These results are not entirely surprising, since they reflect the different
mix of smoking information and the different social context of smoking
in recent years. Indeed, even preteens are extremely sensitive to the
TABLE 3.
Summary of Smokers' Risk PerceptionsCigarette Taxation and Social Consequences of Smoking71
potential risks of smoking since they believe almost unanimously that
smoking is a cause of cancer.9
The final rationality issue to be explored is whether smokers under-
stand the extent of the life that will be lost should they die because of their
smoking behavior. My 1991 estimates of the life expectancy loss indicate
that the overall societal assessment of the expected loss in life expectancy
due to smoking is 11.5 years, with smokers assessing the expected life
expectancy loss at 9.0 years. Based on the original 1988 estimates of the
mortalities shown in Figure 2, one calculates a contemporaneous scientific
reference point of an expected life expectancy loss of 10.9 years for smok-
ing females and 6.9 years for smoking males.10 These figures are below the
subjectively assessed life expectancy loss amounts. Adjustments for tar
and cigarette consumption levels by making the same proportional adjust-
ments to the mortality loss as for total smoking mortality in Table 2 would
reduce the scientifically estimated life expectancy loss further and in-
crease the extent of the overestimation of the life expectancy loss.
Overall, there is little evidence that individuals confer an adverse
externality on their future selves through their smoking behavior. All
the available empirical evidence suggests that decisions are made in a
rational and consistent manner. Although this evidence is not conclu-
sive, the diverse array of information that we have on a wide variety of
aspects of smoking decisions, risk perceptions, and smokers' behavior in
other contexts conveys a quite consistent picture of smoking behavior.
Such behavior may have broader implications for other kinds of exter-
nalities as well, not simply those to the smokers' future selves. Theories
of the household typically assume that the household heads make deci-
sions on behalf not only of themselves but also on behalf of other family
members. Thus, the husband or wife would take into account his or her
own welfare when making the smoking decision as well as the implica-
tions that the smoking behavior would have for the well-being of other
family members.11 If individuals do in fact internalize these intrafamily
externalities, then they will be already reflected in the individual deci-
Indeed, 99 percent or more of all age groups ranging from 7 to 14 believe in the smoking
lung cancer causal link. See Viscusi (1992b) for additional discussion.
10These life expectancy loss estimates are derived in Viscusi (1992b). These are higher than
those that would be generated using recent data. More recent 1993 estimates of the life
expectancy loss, given that a death is smoking-related, imply that 12.1 years of life are lost
conditional on a smoking-related death. This figure in turn must be multiplied by the
probability of a smoking-related death from Table 2. These new data are discussed further
below.
11See Becker (1991). Manning et al. (1991) adopt this assumption as well in their smoking
externality analysis.72Viscusi
sions. Rational individual decisions consequently will imply that house-
hold externalities are internalized as well and need not be considered.
As a result, the discussion below will indicate the value of the household
externalities in the case of environmental tobacco smoke, but it will not
treat these as societal externalities, since rational smokers will internalize
these costs in making their smoking decisions. Since the cost of these
externalities will be explicitly assessed, those who wish to undertake
sensitivity analyses by classifying these costs in a different manner can
readily do so.
6. INSURANCE EXTERNALITIES OF SMOKING
A particularly controversial class of externalities linked to smoking con-
sists of the insurance cost effects arising from the estimated health
consequences of smoking. States such as Mississippi and Florida are
initiating lawsuits in an attempt to recoup state Medicare payments.
Hillary Clinton and the Clinton administration more generally have
used the argument that cigarette smoking leads to higher health insur-
ance costs as a rationale for a higher cigarette tax. There has also begun
to develop a growing sense in the media that smokers are not paying
their own way.
This perception contrasts with the results of economic studies of exter-
nalities. Assessments by Shoven, Sundberg, and Bunker (1989), Manning
et al. (1989, 1991), and Gravelle and Zimmerman (1994) all suggest that
consideration of the insurance-related externalities is more complex than
many public observers have noted. In particular, if smoking indeed leads
to premature death, then there will be competing influences. Higher
health care costs may be imposed in the short run, but these deaths may
save society additional resources later in life, since these smokers will not
be able to collect Social Security and pension benefits for the same amount
of time. Which effect is larger is an empirical issue. Moreover, when one is
assessing these externalities, it is certainly not appropriate to tally only the
potential adverse consequences of smoking, such as the effects on Medi-
care or health insurance costs, and to neglect systematically the estimated
cost savings to society. Proper assessment requires that all legitimate
effects be considered.
The most comprehensive study to date is that by Manning et al.
(1991), which also forms the basis for much of the analysis in Gravelle
and Zimmerman (1994). The approach here will be to take the study by
Manning et al. (1991) as the baseline and to update it in a variety of
ways. These revisions will include much more than recognition of price
changes through shifts in the consumer price index. Rather, using theirCigarette Taxation and Social Consequences of Smoking73
study as a baseline, the estimates were completely reworked to reflect
the changing cost of health insurance as well as our increased under-
standing of the role of smoking. Because these changes are so extensive
and do not involve any conceptual controversies, discussion of the proce-
dure is relegated to the Appendix.
Table 4 reports the external insurance costs per pack of cigarettes for
two different cases, one in which there is no adjustment for changes in
tar level of cigarettes and a second in which the tar and per capita
consumption adjustment is made. The situation in which there is no tar
adjustment closely parallels the Manning et al. (1991) analysis in that
there is no consideration of the changing character of cigarettes, but
there is adjustment for all the different cost factors that have changed
since the original Manning et al. (1991) study.12 These adjustments are
nontrivial. In the zero discount rate case, simply updating the Manning,
et al. (1991) findings based on the shift in the consumer price index
would lead the external insurance cost per pack of cigarettes to be
$1.19, whereas after making all the various adjustments shown in the
Appendix, the 1993 cost estimate at the 0-percent discount rate it is
$1.63. The cost savings that smokers provide to society are conse-
quently higher with my estimates than with the simple update of the
Manning et al. (1991) estimate. If one were to use a discount rate of 5
percent, there are net costs imposed on society, and these would be
higher under my formulation. With a tar adjustment, these costs per
pack are $0.32, whereas an update of the Manning study would have
made these costs per pack equal to $0.27.
Estimates appear in Table 4 for three different discount rates, where
the most reasonable rate corresponding to the long-run real rate of
return in the U.S. economy is around 3 percent. The discount rates
above and below that amount are intended to indicate the sensitivity of
the results to the discounting assumption. The use of any discounting
distinguishes these estimates from some that have appeared in the
literature.13 For concreteness, let us focus on the results for the 3-
12The baseline results from Manning et al. (1991), Table 4.16, pertain to lifetime costs of
smokers minus lifetime costs of nonsmoking smokers.
The estimates reported by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (1994b) indi-
cate medical costs of $18.5 billion and long-term care costs of $3.4 billion. These estimates
represent retrospective costs of smoking an earlier era of cigarettes with a much larger
relative smoking population. The nursing home costs were not estimated directly but
instead were computed by multiplying the medical costs by a factor of proportionality.
None of the cost estimates were discounted. My estimates yielded medical costs of $9.6-
13.2 billion and nursing home cost swings of $4.1-5.3 billion. These estimates are specific




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5Cigarette Taxation and Social Consequences of Smoking75
percent discount rate after making the tar adjustment. Estimates without
a tar adjustment also appear in Table 4, and below I will present esti-
mates that take into account the lag time between cigarette smoking and
insurance costs. The findings in Table 4 are particularly instructive in
indicating which of the externalities are most consequential. The added
cost that smokers generate in terms of medical care costs under the age
of 65 are $0.37 per pack, and there is an additional cost of $0.18 per pack
after age 65, so that the total added medical care cost is $0.55 per pack.
Sick leave costs are negligible, since these are under 1 cent per pack.
Group life insurance also reflects a higher cost amount, since smokers
die sooner than their nonsmoking counterparts, so that this value is
$0.14 per pack. Smoking also leads to an additional cost of fires of just
under $0.02 per pack.
The main areas of cost savings are nursing home care and retirement
pensions. Since smokers die sooner, they will spend less time in nursing
homes, leading to a cost savings of $0.23 per pack. In addition, they wifi
be collecting their pensions and Social Security benefits for a shorter
period, leading to a cost savings of $1.19 per pack. Since smokers die
sooner, society loses the taxes it could have reaped on their earnings.
The health and Social Security tax losses from these effects average
$0.40 per pack. The total net costs of smokers to society are $0.30 per
pack. The fire costs in Table 4 reflect only the insurance costs, which
adjusted Manning et al.'s (1991) estimates to account for current esti-
mates of fire-related damage. Subsequently, fire-related mortality costs
outside the home will be added as well, which is another new feature of
this study.
Table 5 extends these analyses to consider various time lags. In the
case of the 30-year lag point estimates, one obtains verysimilar results
to what was found above. Including lost taxes on earnings as an
externality as well as the other insurance-related costs, one has a total
net cost of smokers to society of $0.23. If taxes on earnings are
excluded from consideration, the net externality cost at a 3-percent
interest rate is $0.53. In effect, smokers are already paying their own
way in the sense that there is a net externality cost savings tosociety
from their smoking because of the cost savings arising from their
premature deaths. These figures exclude from consideration the ciga-
rette taxes already paid by smokers. Thus, there is a net cost savings
from the externalities as well as an additional infusion of tax revenues
from smokers. Taken at face value, these estimates indicate that, if
one were to set the Pigouvian tax amount based inthe 3-percent























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7. ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE
Perhaps the most controversial class of external effects pertaining to
smoking is environmental tobacco smoke. Long regarded as a nuisance
by many nonsmokers, environmental tobacco smoke health risks have
now become an object of considerable social controversy. Both the U.S.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration and members of the
U.S. Congress, with the support of a report by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, have proposed taking initiatives against environmen-
tal tobacco smoke. In each case, these agencies have suggested that
there is a causal link between environmental tobacco smoke and adverse
health outcomes, such as lung cancer and heart disease.
In contrast, previous assessments of the external costs of smoking
have not included environmental tobacco smoke. The studies by Man-
ninget al. (1989, 1991), did not include environmental tobacco smoke
because the evidence at the time of their study was too fragmentary to
make a reliable judgment. Since the time of their study, both OSHA and
EPA have issued reports with environmental tobacco smoke risk esti-
mates based on this literature. Notwithstanding these agencies' willing-
ness to issue such judgments, other critics continue to suggest that the
linkages are not sufficiently strong or well documented to warrant the
same kind of treatment as, for example, the risks to the smokers them-
selves. The recent assessment of environmental tobacco smoke risks by
Gravelle and Zimmerman (1994) in their Congressional Research Service
study concluded, for example, that evidence was still too inconclusive to
warrant calculation of external costs associated with environmental to-
bacco smoke exposures, particularly in the case of heart disease.
Having made these caveats, I will present estimates of the costs im-
posed by environmental tobacco smoke based on the EPA and OSHA
studies. I will then adjust these estimates to account for factors such as
the change in the tar level of cigarettes that were ignored in these govern-
ment studies. Calculating these estimates in no way implies acceptance
of their validity. As a consequence, I will review some of the most salient
limitations of these studies in the course of presenting them. Readers
who wish to make alternative judgments, such as setting these risks
equal to zero, can utilize the results presented here to undertake the
appropriate sensitivity tests.
There are two broad classes of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS)
riskslung cancer and heart disease. Most of the debate in the litera-
ture has been over the validity of the lung cancer risk estimates. Of the
two classes of risk effects, these are the better established. However, asCigarette Taxation and Social Consequences of Smoking79
will be indicated below, even the lung cancer estimates are the object of
substantial, legitimate controversy. The heart disease estimates have
been regarded as being highly speculative by the authors of the heart
disease studies as well as by the agencies employing these results.
Because all parties have given less credence to the heart disease esti-
mate, these estimates have not been the object of as much public discus-
sion. However, since the heart disease mortality rates are considerably
larger than those of lung cancer, it is important both to recognize their
potential implications as well as the limitations associated with their
estimation.
7.1 Lung Cancer Risks
The first class of ETS risks to be considered is that associated with lung
cancer. The scientific evidence that led to the lung cancer risk assess-
ments by EPA consisted of 11 studies of family members exposed to ETS.
Eight indicated that ETS led to a higher relative risk, and three indicated
that ETS led to a lower relative risk. Of these studies, only one showed
statistically significant effects at the 10-percent confidence level, which is
a less demanding statistical test than EPA traditionally applies."Signifi-
cant" results such as this may occur on a random basis. Despite the fact
that only one of the studies yielded relationships that were statistically
significant, and the substantial lack of comparability among the 11 stud-
ies, which were undertaken with data adjusted in different ways and
collected from the 1960s through 1988, EPA pooled the estimates to
make an overall ETS risk assessment. Even based on EPA's risk esti-
mates, the ETS risks are at least two orders of magnitude smaller than
the risks to smokers themselves.
These estimates neglected a variety of fundamental aspects of the risk.
They did not, for example, account for the change in the tar content or
per smoker consumption of cigarettes over time. Theseadjustments will
be made below, using the same weighting system of the studies adopted
by EPA. Another principal drawback of the ETS studies is that they
pertain to risks to other household members. Those exposed to public
ETS will typically be exposed to lower concentrations of ETS as well as
shorter durations of exposures than the family members of a smoker. To
the extent that there is a no-risk threshold, low levels of exposure to ETS
may cause no risk whatsoever to the exposed population.
The character of the studies also is quite different from what econo-
mists might envision. There were, for example, no detailed multivariate
controls to capture differences in demographic characteristics or loca-
tion, though some studies did make a few primitive demographic adjust-80Viscusi
ments.14 If smokers choose to live in highly polluted areas, and if they
and their families get lung cancer because of their broader environmen-
tal exposures, this type of relationship would be captured in these stud-
ies and incorrectly attributed to ETS. Similarly, smokers will be more
likely to be married to other smokers. Higher mortality rates from ETS
may reflect smoking behavior of other family members rather than ETS.
Intrafamily correlations in exposure to risks and risk-taking propensities
will tend to produce spurious correlations.
The nature of the research results is also difficult to interpret. One
recent study "found no adverse effect of exposure to environmental
tobacco smoke during adulthood, including exposure to a spouse who
smoked" (see Janerich et al., 1990). Whether the apparent ETS risk to
children arises from exposure during pregnancy to a smoking mother or
ETS exposure after birth is unclear.
In some instances, inconsistent research results have been treated in
a way that reflects advocacy of an ETS-cancer link rather than a scien-
tific assessment of causality. One 1992 study found that spouses of low
and moderate smokers had a 30-percent lower probability of lung can-
cer, whereas spouses of heavier smokers had a 30-percent higher proba-
bility of lung cancer.15 Although the authors stress the latter finding,
taken at face value their results imply an implausibly shaped dose
response relationship between ETS and cancer that is initially negative
and then positive.
In making its estimate of the number of people exposed to ETS,
EPA also understates the extent to which workers have already been
prevented from being exposed to ETS, thus overstating the potential
risk. Many workplaces have installed special smoking lounges and
banned workplace smoking. EPA may underestimate the number of
workers covered by bans since larger establishments are most likely to
have bans or designated smoking areas (74 percent of firms with 750
or more employees versus 55 percent with 50-99 employees) (see U.S.
EPA, 1994, Exhibit 7-1). EPA, however, did not adjust for workplace
size. The EPA estimates recognize only the efficacy of the 20 percent
of the smoking lounges that meet the strict standards proposed in
recent legislation (HR3434). However, if the other lounges have some
partial efficacy, then one would want to take this influence into ac-
count. As a result, I will also explore the sensitivity of the results to
4 Rather than employ multivariate controls, each study did, however, attempt to havea
control group or utilize a cohort study approach.
This example is drawn from Robert J. Barro, "Send Regulations Up in Smoke," Wall
Street Journal, June 3, 1994.Cigarette Taxation and Social Consequences of Smoking81
the assumption one makes about the prevalence of bans and effective
smoking lounges.
A final caveat that will be noted before a consideration of the risk
estimates is that there is an inconsistency between the EPA and OSHA
risk estimates.16 EPA estimates that each year 2,200 people die from
lung cancer due to ETS exposures. When analyzing deaths in the work-
place, OSHA estimates that 140-722 deaths per year arise from work-
place exposures. In this case, OSHA did not follow EPA's procedure of
pooling the results of the risk studies irrespective of their statistical
significance. These numbers can be linked, since EPA estimates that 82
percent of nonhome exposures occur at work. If one were to apply this
workplace exposure estimate to the OSHA mortality estimate, one ob-
tains an OSHA-based risk estimate of 171-880 lung cancer deaths from
nonhome exposures. Thus, there is considerable inconsistency within
the federal government in the assessment of the lung cancer risk levels.
To obtain the estimate of the value of statistical lives, I utilize the $5
million value per statistical life from Viscusi (1992a, 1993). This value is
the midpoint estimate of the estimated value of life range based on
wage-risk tradeoffs. This value of life is pertinent for a worker with an
average life expectancy of 36.5 years that will be lostbecause of an
injury. In contrast, an individual who contracts lung cancer because of
ETS exposures will incur much less of a loss in life expectancy than
would a worker suffering an acute injury. The average life expectancy
loss for a victim of a smoking-related disease is 12.1 years (see Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, 1993). For concreteness, I have used
the discounted estimated life expectancy loss for smokers in making the
calculation. Thus, the pertinent value of life is $5 million, multiplied by
the ratio of the discounted expected life years lost from smoking divided
by the discounted expected number of life years lost by a worker. One
should also, however, adjust this lost value for the fact that it is de-
ferred. People exposed to environmental tobacco smoke are not killed
instantaneously, so that there must be appropriate recognition of the
time lags involved in making these assessments.
Table 6 provides three sets of estimates. Panel 1 in the table provides
estimates based on EPA risk assessments, and the bottom panel pro-
vides estimates derived by extrapolating the OSHA ETS risk estimates
for the workplace. Within panel 1, the bottom two sections adjust for the
discrepancy between EPA's estimate of the number of people at risk and
16The EPA estimates appear on p. 12 of U.S. EPA (1994), and the OSHA estimates appear
on p. 16011 of the Federal Register, April 5, 1994. The OSHA figures pertain to the average
number of lung cancers over the next 45 years, whereas the EPA estimates pertain to the
current risk estimates.82Viscusi
TABLE 6.
Lung Cancer Deaths Caused by ETS Outside the Home.
Tar level assumption linking risk to exposures
Note: EPA number at risk = 69.1 million (EPA 92); EPA number at risk with 23-percent restrictions =
53.2 million; OSHA number at risk = 14.0 to 36.1 million (OSHA 94-p.16007).
Estimates of workplace risk based on OSHA estimates
Tar level assumption linking risk to exposures
Note: EPA (1994, p. 12) says 18 percent of ETS exposure occurs at the worksite and another 4 percent
occurs at other covered locations outside the home. This implies that 82 percent of nonhome exposure
occurs at the worksite. These data are used to extrapolate the OSHA workplace risk estimates to the
entire population. For reference purposes, the lung cancer estimates embodied in the OSHA estimates
appear above. See the Appendix for how tar adjustment factors are derived for the differing assump-
tions regarding latency periods.














Number of deaths 1,694 1,694 1,694 1,694 1,694
Cost ($ billions) $2.80 $1.53 $0.83 $1.05 $0.45
With 50% tar adjustment:
Number of deaths 1,389 1,285 1,279 1,247 1,220
Cost ($ billions) $2.29 $1.16 $0.63 $0.77 $0.32
With 100% tar adjustment:
Number of deaths 1,171 864 696 748 525
Cost ($ Bfflions) $1.19 $0.78 $0.34 $0.46 $0.14
OSHA-based estimate-lower bound
With 50% tar adjustment:
Number of deaths 444 501 409 399 390
Cost ($ billions) $0.74 $0.44 $0.20 $0.24 $0.10
With 100% tar adjustment:
Number of deaths 374 338 223 239 168
Cost ($ Billions) $0.62 $0.31 $0.11 $0.15 $0.04
OSHA-based estimate-upper bound
With 50% tar adjustment:
Number of deaths 1,150 1,296 1,059 1,032 1,010
Cost ($ billions) $1.89 $1.17 $0.52 $0.64 $0.27
With 100% tar adjustment:
Number of deaths 970 872 577 620 434









Panel 2 No lagaverageestimateaverageestimate
Lower bound
Number of deaths 171 171 171 171 171
Cost ($ billions) $0.28 $0.15 $0.08 $0.11 $0.05
Upper bound
Number of deaths 880 880 880 880 880
Cost ($ billions) $1.46 $0.79 $0.43 $0.55 $0.23Cigarette Taxation and Social Consequences of Smoking83
the estimated number of people at risk derived from the OSHA study.
All risk assessments in panel 1 are based on EPA estimates. In contrast,
panel 2 in Table 6 utilizes both the OSHA risk estimates and estimates of
the population at risk based on OSHA's assessment. For each of these
estimates, the columns indicate the differing assumptions that have
been made with respect to the tar level of cigarettes. The first column
pertains to that in which the ETS studies correctly capture the tar levels.
The next two columns reflect the estimates for which there is a 20-year
moving average that determines the risk level and for which it is the 20-
year lagged point estimate that determines the risk.The final two col-
umns present estimates for the 30-year moving average and 30-yearlag
case.
The first two rows in Table 6 indicate the total number of lung cancer
deaths and the associated costs attributable to ETS using the EPA as-
sumptions in which there is no tar adjustment. The mortality estimate is
a constant value of 1,694 in all cases, but themonetized value of the lives
lost differs because the time frame affects the discounted value of the
these losses, where a discount rate of 3 percent is used throughout. The
next set of rows indicates the mortality costs if one makes an adjustment
for half of the reduction in tar levels and 100 percent of the reduction. If
nonsmokers benefit to the same extent as do smokers from the de-
creased tar levels, then the 100-percent estimates are pertinent. If, how-
ever, they benefited from only 50 percent of thereduction in tar, only
half the change in tar levels is relevant. To the extent that the improve-
ments in tar are achieved through devices such as filters rather than
changes in the composition of cigarettes, there would tend to be less
than a 100-percent effect.
For purposes of illustration, consider the middle 20-year point esti-
mate set of results. The original EPA estimate of 1,694 deaths is reduced
to 1,279 if half of the change in tar levels is accounted for and 696 if the
entirety of the tar change is recognized. The value of the mortality costs
changes similarly, since it decreases from $0.83 billion in the base EPA
case to $0.63 billion in the 50-percent reduction case, and $0.34 billion in
the 100-percent reduction case.
If instead one utilizes the EPA risk estimates in conjunction with the
OSHA number at risk, one obtains considerably lower estimates of the
mortality cost. For the 100-percent tar adjustment case, estimates based
on the low end of the OSHA risk assessment are223 deaths and a
monetary cost of $0.11 billion, with the high estimate being 577 deaths
and $0.28 billion.
Table 7 adjusts the outside the home ETS lung cancer estimates by
assuming that current smoking restrictions are 50 percent effectiveTABLE 7.
Lung Cancer Deaths Caused by ETS Outside the Home
With an Assumption of 50% Effectiveness of Current Restrictions
Number of deaths and discounted cost of deaths
(billions of dollars)
See the Appendix for how tar adjustment factors are derived for the differing assumptions regarding
latency periods.
Note: The first two panels of Table 6 assumed that 23 percent of worksites (EPA, 1994) are currently
subject to restrictions comparable with those proposed by the EPA. Table 7 incorporates evidence that
the EPA underestimated the number of persons subject to these restrictions and assumes that 50
percent of workplaces are currently covered. The reasoning for this is as follows:
First, the EPA data suggest that 59 percent of worksites with more than 50 employees are subject to
smoking bans or have effective smoking lounges. This is used as evidence that 59 percent of persons
working at these sites are subject to these restrictions. This conclusion is not valid, however, because
there is a direct correlation between worksite size and smoking restrictions (with 74 percent restrictions
for the largest worksites). Since there are more persons working at these larger worksites (and, thus,
subject to the greater restriction), one would expect that more than 59 percent of the persons in this
category would be subject to restrictions.
Second, the EPA assumes that 10 percent of all worksites with fewer than 50 persons are subject to
similar restrictions. This estimate appears to be arbitrary given that there is no available data for these
firms. A reasonable extrapolation of rates from worksites with greater than 50 persons would lead to a
much higher estimate.
Third, the EPA only includes smoking lounges that would meet the standards of their proposed rule.
This is only 20 percent of all smoking lounges. The other 80 percent also afford nonsmokers some
protection, which is not recognized by EPA.
Finally, the data used is from 1992, but the policy would not be implemented until 1995 at the
earliest. Normally this discrepancy would be considered insignificant. In this case; however, there is
already a strong trend toward private (and local public) restriction. Restrictive smoking policies in-
creased from 27 percent in 1985 to 59 percent in 1992.














EPA estimate (based on EPA 94 estimate of 1,694 deaths)
With 50% tar adjustment:
Number of deaths 902 834 831 810 792
Cost ($ billions) $1.50 $0.75 $0.40 $0.51 $0.21
With 100% tar adjustment:
Number of deaths 760 561 452 486 341
Cost ($ billions) $1.25 $0.51 $0.23 $0.31 $0.09
OSHA-based estimate-lower bound
With 50% tar adjustment:
Number of deaths 236 267 218 212 208
Cost ($ billions) $0.40 $0.24 $0.10 $0.13 $0.06
With 100% tar adjustment:
Number of deaths 199 180 119 127 90
Cost ($ billions) $0.33 $0.17 $0.06 $0.07 $0.02
OSHA-based estimate-upper bound
With 50% tar adjustment:
Number of deaths 612 690 564 549 538
Cost ($ billions) $1.01 $0.62 $0.27 $0.34 $0.14
With 100% tar adjustment:
Number of deaths 516 464 307 330 231
Cost ($ billions) $0.86 $0.42 $0.15 $0.20 $0.06Cigarette Taxation and Social Consequences of Smoking85
rather than EPA's assumption that restrictions are 23 percent effective
(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1994, p. 28; also see notes to
Table 4). If these adjustments are made, then one obtains estimates in
Table 7 that are roughly two-thirds the size of those in the top panel 1 of
Table 6.17 The OSHA-based estimates in Table 7 reflect the population
adjustment, not OSHA's risk value adjustment. If additional restrictions
on smoking in the workplace are enacted, as would be the case if OSHA
enacts its proposed regulation banning workplace smoking except in
designated areas, then these estimates of course would be dramatically
reduced even further.
In much the same manner, one can calculate the lung cancer deaths
caused by ETS inside the home. Table 8 provides these estimates. There
are no OSHA-based estimates for Table 8, since OSHA did not address
risks within the home. For the EPA-based risk estimates there will be 800
deaths per year within the home. Making the 50-percent tar adjustment
reduces these estimates by an average of about one-fourth, and making
the 100-percent tar adjustment reduces the estimates by an average of
about one-half. It should be emphasized that including any lung cancer
death risk estimate inside the home within an externality assessment is
problematic, since these costs may be internalized by the smoker who
takes into account the well-being of family members in making the smok-
ing decision.
7.2 Heart Disease
The overall mortality costs associated with the ETS-heart disease linkage
are even greater. EPA estimates that from 8,760 to 17,520 deaths per year
from heart disease are due to ETS exposures outside the home.
Although these estimates are higher than those for lung cancer, they
are based on much weaker scientific evidence. Indeed, the recent study
by Steenland (1992) that provides the scientific basis for EPA's estimates
includes a myriad of caveats and cautionary notes that should make one
reluctant to attach much precision to these estimates.18 To deal with
Panel 2 in Table 6 is not adjusted, since OSHA did not indicate its smoking restriction for
the underlying risk estimates.
18In particular, Steenland (1992) makes the following observations: "While the lung cancer
risk among never-smokers exposed to ETS is well established, a possible risk of heart
disease due to ETS is more controversial (p. 94).... Environmental tobacco smoke is
difficult to measure directly (p. 94).... The relative contribution of ETS exposure at work
to total exposure is not well known (p. 94).... The principal weaknesses in the epidemio-
logic evidence to date have been the indirect methods of assessing exposure (via spousal
smoking) and the lack of data on exposures to ETS outside the home (p. 95).... Also,
there are many risk factors for heart disease, and it is difficult to control well for all of them.
Another problem with the epidemiologic data is the seemingly large effect that ETS has on86Viscusi
TABLE 8.
Lung Cancer Deaths Caused by ETS Inside the Home
Number of deaths and discounted cost of deaths
(billions of dollars)
The base figure is from the U.S. EPA (1994).
See the Appendix for how tar adjustment factors are derived for the differing assumptions regarding
latency periods.
what the author termed "considerable uncertainty" regarding the re-
sults, EPA simply scaled down the mortality estimates. It should also be
noted that, although EPA adopted the Steenland (1992) findings, it did
not adopt Steenland's result that 55 percent of heart disease deaths are
due to nonhouse exposures, but instead adopted a 73-percent assump-
tion, which would lead to a higher estimated public externality.
The EPA estimates of heart disease also suffer from the same classes of
deficiencies as did the lung cancer risk estimates. In particular, they did
not take into account the lag time between exposure and the onset of
disease, and they abstracted from changes in the tar level and composi-
tion of cigarettes.
Table 9 summarizes the heart disease mortality estimates that will
occur outside the home. In each case, low and high estimates based on
heart disease compared with the effect of mainstream smoking (p. 95). ... They showed no
excess of lung cancer, and cross-sectional smoking data revealed smoking habits similar to
the U.S. referent population. Hence, increased cigarette smoking was unlikely to explain the
excess heart disease risk (p. 96).... A number of assumptions are involved in estimating
the heart disease mortality due to ETS, adding an unfortunate level of uncertainty. The most
important assumption is that the relative risks for ETS and heart disease, derived from the
epidemiologic evidence, are reasonably accurate. The epidemiologic results may be ques-
tioned, given the inherent uncertainties of any epidemiologic study (p. 98).... Consider-
able uncertainty is involved in extrapolating from the epidemiologic data, which consider
the relative risks for never-smokers living with smokers, to estimating relative risks for those













Number of deaths 800 800 800 800 800
Cost ($ billions) $1.32$0.72 $0.39 $0.50 $0.21
With 50% tar adjustment
Number of deaths 656 607 604 589 576
Cost ($ billions) $1.08$0.55 $0.30 $0.36 $0.15
With 100% tar adjustment
Number of deaths 553 408 329 353 248
Cost ($ billions) $0.91$0.37 $0.16 $0.22 $0.06Cigarette Taxation and Social Consequences of Smoking87
the EPA assumptions are presented, and Table 9 also includes low and
high estimates based on OSHA's estimates of the mortality costs of ETS.
The annual death count in every instance is much higher than the lung
cancer mortality rate. If one uses the nonhome exposure amount advo-
cated by Steenland (1992) of 55 percent rather than the 73-percent esti-
mate utilized by EPA, one reduces the mortality estimate and associated
costs. Both cases appear in Table 9.
The discounted cost associated with these deaths has a value ranging
from $4.3 billion to $8.6 billion in the 20-year point estimate case where
these estimates are based on the assumption that the extent of life lost
due to heart disease from ETS exposures is the same as the life expec-
tancy loss attributable to smoking overall. If one adopts a 100-percent tar
adjustment, these estimates decline to $2.4$4.8 billion. The other col-
umns in Table 9 represent other tar lag situations, ranging from no lag
between EPA studies and tar levels, to the case in which there is a 30-
year lag time. The importance of these lags is apparent, since the 30-year
point estimates of the costs are considerably below the values in the
situation in which there is no lag.
Table 10 presents analogous findings for heart disease deaths caused
by ETS inside the home. Results appear assuming 27 percent of expo-
sures are inside the home (EPA's assumption and 45 percent [Steenland
estimatel). These mortality amounts are also substantial, since the death
count range even in the lowest scenario presented is 3,240 annual
deaths. Even with a 30-year lag before these deaths occur, the mortality
costs are $1.25 billion if one makes no tar adjustment. As with the public
ETS risks, tar adjustments substantially decrease these values.
Table 11 summarizes the passive smoking costs evaluated at a 3-
percent discount rate. These are the ETS values that will be used in
calculating the total externality costs of cigarettes. Three categories of
costs are considered: insurance externalities, ETS mortality costs, and
fire-related mortality. The insurance externalities from ETS are the first
estimates of this kind and reflect the analog of the insurance externalities
from smokers themselves. The inside-the-home heart disease death esti-
mates are excluded for two reasons. First, deaths inside the home may
well be internalized by the smoker and consequently are not exter-
nalities. Second, as in the case of the other heart disease estimates, the
underlying scientific basis for these estimates is extremely fragile and
highly speculative. The low and high estimates are quite disparate, so
the assumptions one adopts are consequential. For the median estimates
and a 20-year point estimate for the tar adjustment, the net ETS cost is 27
cents per pack, virtually all of which is due to heart disease costs.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Total Annual Social Costs: Insurance Externalities ($ billions),
assuming 3% discount rate
Fire deaths
(Nonresidential) $0.03 $0.03 $0.03 $0.03 $0.03
Note: Smoker's insurance externalities are taken from Tables 4 and 5, and are multiplied by the number
of packs consumed in the U.S. (The Tobacco Institute, 1993).
ETS insurance externalities are found by dividing ETS deaths by total smoker's deaths due to
smoking (CDC 1993) and multiplying this fraction with smoker's insurance externalities.
Costs of ETS deaths from lung cancer are the low, median and high figures from Tables 6 and 7.
Costs of heart disease are the low, median, and high numbers from Table 9. The low, median, and high
numbers for each category (no lag, 20-year MA, etc.) are found by visual inspection except where the
median is an average of the two closest figures. For example, the no-lag, heart disease numbers from
Table 9 would be: low = $4.21, median = $17.62 ((14.45 + 20.78)/2), and high = $28.91.






























ETS mortality smoking costs
Lung cancer (nonhome)
Low $0.28 $0.15 $0.06 $0.11 $0.02
Median $1.25 $0.62 $0.27 $0.34 $0.12
High $2.80 $1.53 $0.83 $1.05 $0.45
Heart disease (nonhome)
Low $4.21 $1.98 $0.81 $1.17 $0.36
Median $12.10 $5.88 $3.20 $4.05 $1.73
High $27.59$15.76 $8.58$10.85 $4.63
20-Year 30-Year
moving20-Yearmoving30-Year
No lagaverage point average point92Viscusi
which are the first such estimates in the literature. These calculations
assumed a value of life of $5 million.
8. CONCLUSION: THE NET EXTERNALITY COSTS
OF SMOKING
Smokers now pay an average of $0.53 per pack in cigarette taxes. If our
objective is to set an appropriate tax level to reflect the externalities
generated by cigarettes, the question then becomes whether this tax is
sufficient to address the externality costs imposed.
These costs consist of several potential elements. The first of these
the externalities to the smoker's future selfappear to be unimportant.
Very few smokers underestimate the hazards associated with smoking,
and, indeed, overall smokers over assess the risks of smoking. To the
extent that smokers also internalize the ETS risks to household mem-
bers, this effect would be captured as well in these private decisions.
The focal point of the externality cost debate has not been losses to the
smokers' future selves but on the health insurance and related costs
associated with smoking. A comprehensive assessment of these costs
suggests that on balance, smokers do not cost society resources because
of their smoking activities, but rather save society money. Evidence
presented in Section 6 indicates that at reasonable rates of discount, the
cost savings that result because of the premature deaths of smokers
through their lower Social Security and pension costs will more than
compensate for the added costs imposed by smokers, chiefly through
higher health insurance costs. Thus, not only is there not a rationale for
imposing a tax due to these insurance-related externalities, but rather on
balance there is a net cost savings to society even excluding consider-
ation of the current cigarette taxes paid by smokers.
The principal externality cost component that might provide the impe-
tus for a cigarette tax consists of ETS costs. Environmental tobacco
smoke, however, is now the target of a wide range of explicit regulatory
proposals that would limit public exposures to ETS. Legislation before
Congress would ban smoking in public places. The Occupational Safety
and Health Administration has proposed a regulation that would ban
smoking in the workplace except in situations where a designated smok-
ing area meeting stringent ventilation conditions was provided. If these
measures are enacted, it would not be appropriate to consider the cur-
rent levels of external cost of ETS in setting the appropriate tax level
because the public externalities would have been addressed by an alter-
native policy tool, direct regulation.
However, if we proceed under the assumption that these measuresCigarette Taxation and Social Consequences of Smoking93
will not be enacted, then the costs associated with ETS are potentially very
large, if one accepts the very imprecise and conservative risk judgments of
EPA and OSHA. If one takes these types of estimates at face value and
incorporates them in a net tally of the combined externalities associated
with smoking, including the cost of ETS as well as all the insurance-
related costs, one obtains the net cost figures indicated in Table 12.19 The
top panel of Table 12 indicates the cost with no tar adjustments, and the
bottom panel indicates the tar-adjusted cost. Based on the 30-year point
estimates and the median risk assumptions, without a tar adjustment
smokers on balance save society $0.18 per pack even including ETS costs.
In the tar-adjusted case, smoking is a break-even proposition. Even the
worst case scenario shown in Table 12 in which there is a twenty-year
moving average link between saving and the observed effects yields as a
high estimate in the tar adjustment case a value of $0.41 per pack, which is
an amount below current cigarette tax levels. As a consequence, cigarette
taxes already exceed the level of the estimated externalities.
It should be emphasized that these calculations were extremely conser-
vative in that they included the very highly speculative ETS estimates.
The high end of the range in effect takes the EPA estimates of the ETS
risks at face value. Indeed, all the estimates presented here recognized a
substantial ETS component, even though one might have reasonably set
these costs equal to zero, as in all previous smoking externality studies.
These risks are highly debated and uncertain in the case of the lung
cancerETS risk, and the evidence for the heart diseaseETS risk is at
such a preliminary stage that the risk estimates border on being conjec-
ture. If one were to exclude the costs of ETS, the analysis could reduce to
the results in Tables 4 and 5 in which smokers saved society $0.23$0.32
per pack. However, even if we were to accept the highly uncertain risk
estimates that have been put forth, the overall conclusion with respect to
need for a higher cigarette tax is not affected. Although consideration of
the ETS effects leads to a substantial shift in the externality cost esti-
mates from all previous studies of this issue, overall cigarette taxes ex-
ceed the associated externalities.
19The figures in Table 12 are calculated as the sum of insurance externalities, passive
smoking costs, passive smoking insurance externalities, and nonresidential fire deaths.
Insurance externalities are computed as the estimates from Table 5 times the number of
packs sold in 1993 (The Tobacco Institute, 1993, p. 6). Passive smoking costs are assessed as
the low, median, and high numbers from Tables 6, 7 (lung cancer), and 9 (heart disease).
Passive smoking insurance externalities are estimated as the insurance externalities figure
times the number of deaths due to passive smoking divided by the total number of smok-
ing attributable deaths (CDC, 1994a). The value of nonresidential fire deaths is calculated
as the number of nonresidential fire deaths in 1990 (Federal Emergency Management
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APPENDIX
The basic building block for the insurance-related externality cost esti-
mates presented in Section 6 consisted of the results reported in Chapter 4
of Manning et al. (1991) (see, in particular, Table 4-15). This study pro-
vided a comprehensive assessment of the external cost of smoking by
using data from the Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) and the National
Health Interview Survey (NHIS). In their study, the authors attempted to
avoid contaminating the smoking estimates by purging the data of system-
atic differences between smokers and nonsmokers other than their smok-
ing status. In doing this they created a "non-smoking smoker" stylized
individual for use in their analyses. The procedure to be described here
does not alter the fundamental structure of their assessment, but instead
undertakes a large number of revisions in their estimates, most of which
were price-related but some of which pertain to more fundamental consid-
erations such as the adjustments for tar levels in cigarettes and per capita
cigarette consumption. The most important percentage adjustments in-
cluded the following: group life insurance costs and total coverage, nurs-
ing home costs and frequency of utilization, and overall medical care
costs. For ease of reference, these amendments of their analysis are distin-
guished by topic below.
Medical Care
In the case of medical care expenses for those under age 65, the adjust-
ment figure used is the real rate of medical cost increase since the period
of their data. For this age range, the Manning et al. (1991) data is taken
from the HIE (1975), so the pertinent adjustment factor to bring the costs
to 1993 dollars is 1.585 (medical cost index taken from Statistical Abstract
of the United States, 1993 and World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1994). For
individuals age 65 and over, the data in Manning et al. (1991) is from the
NHIS (1983), leading to an adjustment factor calculated similarly to that
for those under 65 of 1.3922.
Sick Leave
Manning et al. (1991) computed the sick leave costs using data in NHIE
and NHIS. Manning et al. (1991) used HIE for men under 65 years of
age, while they used NHIS for men 65 and older. All the data for women
was taken from NHIS, where NHIS data was used in conjunction with
1985 CPS data to determine individual wage rates. Manning et al. (1991)
assumed that 38 percent of the work loss was covered by sick leave.
Based on the information included in Appendix G of Manning et al.
(1991), 97 percent of the earnings for men occur before age 65. As a96Viscusi
result, 97 percent of men's earnings levels were updated from 1975, and
3 percent were updated from 1985, while 100 percent of the women's
earnings were updated from the year 1985.
To adjust the sick leave figures, the employment cost index, as re-
ported in Employment Cost Indexes, 1975-1992 (Bureau of Labor Statistics,
U.S. Department of Labor, 1993, p. 21) was used. After the estimates for
women and men were obtained, data from the Statistical Abstract of the
United States, 1993 (p. 402) were used to obtain updated proportions of
women and men in the workforce, which were then used to assess the
weighted average of the workforce mix. Manning et al.'s (1991) assump-
tion that 38 percent of the work loss is covered by sick leave was left
unchanged.
Group Life Insurance
Group coverage per worker is estimated by Manning et al. (1991) to be
$19,300, which in 1992 dollars is $24,195. In 1992 there were 117.598
million workers, and total group life insurance coverage in the United
States was estimated to be $4,240,919 (American Council of Life Insur-
ance in World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1994).
Nursing Home Care
Manning et al. (1991) states that 4.79 percent of the population over 65 is
in nursing homes and that $9,247 ($12,191 in 1993 dollars) is the annual
covered cost per patient. In 1990, 5.09 percent of the population over 65
was in nursing homes (U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States, 1993 and World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1994).
In addition to adjusting for the changing nursing home population,
there is also an adjustment for the cost of nursing home care. In 1990 the
covered cost per patient was $21,290 (amount in 1993 dollars following
the same procedure as above).
Retirement Pensions
In estimating the costs of pensions, Manning et al. (1991) included Social
Security, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), public assistance, veter-
ans' compensation, and pension income (using 1985 data). To address
trends in these amounts, estimates were obtained from the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, Trends in Pensions, 1992, and U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, Annual Statistical Supplement of the Social Security
Bulletin, 1993. The updated figures are for 1992.
Trends in the proportion of the population covered by these programs
were also taken into account. A weighted average (weights based on
gross outlays of these programs) of the percentage change of those overCigarette Taxation and Social Consequences of Smoking97
65 receiving payments was used to derive the adjustment factor. To
calculate the cost adjustment factor, the weighted real increase in the
value of payments made to recipients was used.
Fires
Manning et al. (1991) estimate that fires caused by smokers lead to
$405.14 million in damages (1990 dollars converted from 1986 dollars).
According to FEMA (Fire in the United States: 1983-1990, National Fire
Data Center, FEMA, 1993), in 1990, there were $354.5 million in dam-
ages attributable to smokers.
Taxes on Earnings
Manning et al. (1991) used the 1985 CPS to determine earnings received.
This figure was updated using information from the employment cost
index, which appears in the U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical
Abstract of the United States, 1993.
Taxes on earnings were calculated as being the amount that an individ-
ual would pay toward the above costs. It was calculated in such a way
that taxes collected equal costs. Since Manning et al.'s (1991) analysis,
total costs have risen by 40 percent. However, the demographics of
smoking have changed so that the nonsmoking smoker is now of a lower
socioeconomic class than in 1975 and, thus, is subsidized by society to a
greater extent than before. This would tend to shrink taxes proportion-
ally on earnings for both smokers and nonsmoking smokers.
Per Capita Cigarette Consumption
The cost estimates have been adjusted for changes in the per capita
consumption of cigarettes. Data for 1923 to 1990 on per capita cigarette
consumption is drawn from the National Cancer Institute, U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, Strategies to Control Tobacco Use in
the United States. Data for 1991 to 1993 are drawn from the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Tobacco Situation and Outlook Report, September
1993.
Percentage of Population Smoking (P)
Data (% smoking20 years of age) for 1965-1966, 1970, 1974, 1976-
1980, 1983, and 1985 are from Reducing the Health Consequences of Smoking:
25 Years of Progress (Report of the Surgeon General, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, 1989, p. 269). Data (% smoking18 years
of age) for 1987-88 and 1990 are from Health: United States, 1991 (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, 1992, p. 203). Data (18) for
1949, 1957, 1958, and 1964 are from Smoking and Health (a Report of the98Viscusi
Surgeon General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
1979, p. A-9). Data (18) for 1985 and 1991 are from Centers for Disease
Control via "Smoking Split Decision" The Courier Journal (1/9/94, p. 1). All
other years are linearly estimated using the two closest years from which
data is available.
Tar (T)
Data for 1954 and 1968-1983 are from Smoking, Tobacco, and Health: A Fact
Book (CDC, DHHS, p. 21). Data for 1955-1967 is from The Health Conse-
quences of Smoking: The Changing Cigarette (A Report of the Surgeon Gen-
eral, DHHS, 1981, p. 207). Data for 1984 to 1993 are derived by running a
regression of % <15 mg on tar for 1967 to 1983 and using the resulting
coefficient to estimate tar levels. Data for 1923 to 1954 are derived by
running a regression of year on tar and using the resulting coefficient to
estimate tar levels.
% Less than 15 mg
Data are taken from Federal Trade Commission Report to Congress for 1990:
Pursuant to the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 1992 (FTC,
1992, pp. 28-30).
Unadjusted Packs per Smoker (S)
S=(C/20)/(P/100)
Tar-adjusted Per Capita Cigarette Consumption (CA)
CA=C*T/46.1
Tar-adjusted Packs per Smoker (SA)
SA=(CA/20)/(P/100)
Tar Adjustment (TAR)The example below is for the 20-year moving
average case. The value of CONS is also for this case.
TAR=SLIM(T_2O.T_1)/SUM(T1994..T2UI3).
Consumption Adjustment (CONS):
CONS=SUM(S_20.S_1)/SLIM(S14..T2013).Cigarette Taxation and Social Consequences of Smoking99
Discount Rates
The Manning 0% and 5% rates were taken from the Manning et al. (1991)
study. The Manning 3-percent rate was calculated in the following man-
ner: First, Table A was constructed using data from Appendix G and pp.
36-37 (in Manning et al., 1991). This gives the absolute and proportional
values for medical costs. From this calculation it was found that a 3-
percent discount rate is equivalent to the 5-percent number plus 16-20
percent of the difference between 0 percent and 5 percent (depending
upon whether the cost in question occurs relatively early or late in life).
REFERENCES
Ames, Bruce N., and Lois S. Gold (1993). "Environmental Pollution and Cancer:
Some Misconceptions." In Phantom Risk, Kenneth R. Foster, David E. Bern-
stein, and Peter W. Huber (eds.). Cambridge: The MIT Press, pp. 153-181.
Barro, Robert J. (1994). "Send Regulations Up in Smoke." Wall Street Journal, June
3, 1994.
Becker, G.S. (1991). A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
M. Grossman, and K.M. Murphy (June 1994). "An Empirical Analysis of
Cigarette Addiction." American Economic Review 84:396-418.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor. (1993). Employment Cost
Indexes, 1975-1992. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Calfee, J.E. (1986). "Cigarette Advertising, Health Information and Regulation."
FTC Working Pper.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (1989). Smoking, Tobacco and Health: A fact book.
(August 27, 1993). "Cigarette SmokingAttributable Mortality and Years
of Potential Life LostUnited States, 1990." Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report 42:645-649.
(January 9, 1994). "Smoking Split Decision." The Courier Journal.
(May 20, 1994a). "Cigarette Smoking Among AdultsUnited States,
1992, and Changes in the Definition of Current Cigarette Smoking." Morbidity
and Mortality Weekly Report, p. 342.
Cothern, C. Richard (1992). Comparative Environmental Risk Assessment. Boca
Raton, FL: Lewis Publishers.
Federal Emergency Management Agency. (1993). Fire in the [IS. Washington
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Federal Register (April 5, 1994). Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register,
National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration.
Federal Trade Commission (1992). Federal Trade Commission Report to Congress for
1990: Pursuant to the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 1992.
Fullerton, Don, and D.L. Rodgers (1993). Who Bears the Lifetime Tax Burden?
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Gravelle, J., and D. Zimmerman (1994). "Cigarette Taxes to Fund Health Care100Viscusi
Reform: An Economic Analysis." Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Report.
Hersch, Joni, and W. Kip Viscusi (1990). "Cigarette Smoking, Seatbelt Use, and
Differences in Wage-Risk Trade-Offs." Journal of Human Resources 25:202-227.
International Agency for Research on Cancer (1985). Tobacco: A Major Interna-
tional Health Hazard. New York: Oxford University Press.
Ippolito, P.M., and R.A. Ippolito (1984). "Measuring the Value of Life Saving
from Consumer Reactions to New Information." Journal of Public Economics
25:53-81.
Janerich, D.T., W.D. Thompson, L.R. Varela, P. Greenwald, S. Chorost, C.
Tucci, M.B. Zaman, M.R. Melamed, M. Kiely, and M.F. McKneally (1990).
"Lung Cancer and Exposure to Tobacco Smoke in the Household." The New
England Journal of Medicine 323:632-636.
Manning, W.G., E.B. Keeler, J.P. Newhouse, E.M. Sloss, and J. Wasserman
(1989). "The Taxes of Sin: Do Smokers and Drinkers Pay Their Way?" Journal of
the American Medical Association 261:1604-1609.
and (1991). The Costs of Poor Health Habits.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
National Fire Data Center, FEMA (1993). Fire in the United States: 1983-1990.
Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Poterba, J.M. (1989). "Lifetime Incidence and the Distributional Burden of Excise
Taxes." American Economic Review 79:325-330.
Schelling, T.C. (1984). Choice and Consequence. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
Shoven, J.B., J.O. Sundberg, and J.P. Bunker (1989). "The Social Security Cost of
Smoking." In The Economics of Aging, D.A. Wise (ed.). Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, pp. 231-251.
Steenland, Kyle (1992). "Passive Smoking and the Risk of Heart Disease." Journal
of the American Medical Association 267:94-99.
Tobacco Institute (1993). The Tax Burden on Tobacco: Historical Compilation 1993,
Vol. 28. Washington, DC: Tobacco Institute.
U.S. Department of Agriculture (1993). Tobacco Situation and Outlook Report. Sep-
tember 1993. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Department of Commerce (1993). Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1993.
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce.
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (1964). Smoking and Health:
Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service.
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1979). Smoking and Health, A
Report of the Surgeon General. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office.
Human Services (1981). The Health Consequences of Smoking: The Changing
Cigarette, A Report of the Surgeon General. Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office.
(1989). Reducing the Health Consequences of Smoking: 25 Years of Progress.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
(1992). Health United States, 1991. Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office.
(1993). Annual Statistical Supplement of the Social Security Bulletin, 1993.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.Cigarette Taxation and Social Consequences of Smoking101
National Cancer Institute (1991). Strategies to Control Tobacco Use in the
United States. Rockville, MD: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
U.S. Department of Labor (1992). Trends in Pensions, 1992. Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1994). The Costs and Benefits of Smoking
Restrictions: An Assessment of the Smoke-Free Environment Act of 1993 (HR .3434)
Indoor Air Division, Office of Radiation and Indoor Air. Washington, DC:
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
Viscusi, W.K. (1992a). Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk.
New York: Oxford University Press.
(1992b). Smoking: Making the Risky Decision. New York: Oxford University
Press.
(1993). "The Value of Risks to Life and Health." Journal of Economic Litera-
ture XXXI: 1912-1946.
Wells, A.J. (1988). "An Estimate of Adult Mortality in the United States from
Passive Smoking." Environmental International 14: 249-265.
World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1994 (1994). New York: Press Pub. Co.